Table rows

The row.* family (6 verbs). Every verb enters through the one front door: it is capability-checked, permission-checked, scope-checked and audited before it runs (see Security & permissions). Each entry below lists its capability, risk class (which fixes the minimum autonomy level), the minimum caller permission, its availability tier, whether it is idempotent, and any outbound egress.

Bulkrow.bulk

{ tableId, rows: [ { id?, fields } ], mergeWithLocks? }. The bounded bulk write: each entry creates a row (no id) or updates an existing one (id). BOUNDED: more than MAX_BULK_ROWS entries is REJECTED outright (never silently truncated). Per row it honours the SAME guards as the single-row path (INV-1, one write path via set_fact): prototype-pollution + the lock-keyspace fence on every field key, the computed-write rejection (INV-6), and mergeWithLocks (default true - a __lock__ed cell is SKIPPED, reported per row; mergeWithLocks=false is refused if it would overwrite a lock - fail-closed, never silently clobber a hand-verified cell). One row’s hard error (a computed-column write, a missing column) fails the whole call (atomic on the dispatch tx) - a partial bulk is never committed.

Call POST /v/row.bulk with a JSON body; returns JSON (or { error, code }). Not advertised over MCP (admin-only); reachable via the CLI and HTTP doors.

Createrow.create

Creates a typed Row SHELL (no JSON cell blob - the Opbox TableRow.data footgun is retired). If fields (a key->value map) is supplied, each non-computed field is written as a canonical Fact via the same upsert as cell.set (INV-1, one write path). Any field key is prototype-pollution-fenced; a write to a computed column is rejected (INV-6).

Input { tableId, fields?, linkedMatterId?, displayOrder? } (fields ending in ? are optional)

Call POST /v/row.create with a JSON body; returns JSON (or { error, code }). Not advertised over MCP (admin-only); reachable via the CLI and HTTP doors.

Deleterow.delete

Deletes one row; its Facts cascade by the FK (migration 0026). Any derived side-effect (an entity_edge regeneration, a downstream rollup) is FIRE-AND-FORGET (INV-2): the canonical delete is the transition, the derived index is rebuilt off-band and never gates this write. RLS-scoped + explicit workspace predicate; a row in another workspace reads back not-found (anti-enumeration).

Input { id } (fields ending in ? are optional)

Call POST /v/row.delete with a JSON body; returns JSON (or { error, code }). Not advertised over MCP (admin-only); reachable via the CLI and HTTP doors.

Getrow.get

s one row + the canonical Facts joined to it (cell key -> value). RLS-scoped + an explicit workspace predicate. PII facts are surfaced as encrypted (the decrypt-on-read path is a later beat - the skeleton returns the encryption_scheme tag so the cell is visibly regulated, never the plaintext from a ciphertext column).

Input { id } (fields ending in ? are optional)

Call POST /v/row.get with a JSON body; returns JSON (or { error, code }). Not advertised over MCP (admin-only); reachable via the CLI and HTTP doors.

Listrow.list

Lists the rows of a table for the inline-edit grid (the data-plane grid surface). Each row carries its id + its cells (the canonical Facts: a map of columnKey -> value). RLS-scoped with an EXPLICIT workspace_id = $ predicate. PII facts are surfaced as masked (the decrypt-on-read path is a later beat - the list returns the encryption_scheme tag so a cell is visibly regulated, never plaintext from a ciphertext column). Computed columns have no Facts (INV-6) so they do not appear in the cell map. IDEMPOTENT: the list is a projection, never a write.

Input { tableId, limit?, offset? } (fields ending in ? are optional)

Call POST /v/row.list with a JSON body; returns JSON (or { error, code }). Not advertised over MCP (admin-only); reachable via the CLI and HTTP doors.

Patchrow.patch

Partial field write: each key in fields is written as a canonical Fact via the same upsert as cell.set. REJECTS a write to a computed column (INV-6). Honours cell locks (a __lock__ed cell is NOT overwritten - it is skipped, reported in lockedSkipped). Prototype-pollution keys are fenced.

Input { id, fields } (fields ending in ? are optional)

Call POST /v/row.patch with a JSON body; returns JSON (or { error, code }). Not advertised over MCP (admin-only); reachable via the CLI and HTTP doors.